

CHINA RIGHTS FORUM Spring 1996
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Lost Cause

The struggle to expose abuses of Shanghai's orphans

For close to five years, several employees at the Shanghai Children's Welfare Institute struggled to get city officials to deal with conditions in the orphanage including high death rates, physical and sexual abuse of children, financial improprieties and employment of under-age orphans in profit-making enterprises. Despite extensive official investigations, their campaign resulted instead in the complete vindication of Institute Director Han Weicheng and in professional ruin for them.

The most senior official directly responsible for suppressing the results of the inquiries was Wu Bangguo, then the city's Communist Party secretary. Other top Shanghai officials were also informed of the abuses at the orphanage. These included Huang Ju, the city's then mayor; Xie Lijuan, vice-mayor responsible for health, education and social welfare; and Sun Jinfu, the director of the municipal Civil Affairs Bureau which oversees the Institute.

*During 1995 two key witnesses to these events, former Institute employee Dr. Zhang Shuyun and former Institute inmate Ai Ming, succeeded in escaping from China, bringing with them extensive written documentation of the official investigation and subsequent cover-up. The following account of the whole process, an edited version of Chapter VI of the Human Rights Watch Asia report *Death by Default*, is based on those materials.*

EARLY COMPLAINTS

In September 1988, Dr. Zhang Shuyun was appointed to a joint medical and administrative position at the Shanghai Children's Welfare Institute, with responsibility for supervising the completion of a Rehabilitation Center and conducting biomedical tests.

In October 1988, Dr. Zhang was joined at the orphanage by a former colleague, Li Guilan, who took up a position as a speech therapist. Zhang and Li quickly became aware of severe problems at the Institute, including the high death rate among newly admitted infants and the routine physical abuse of older children. In 1989 they began to seek out other dissatisfied employees to assist them in exposing these abuses. The most prominent of their eventual allies was Yang Yaming, a physical therapist and a Communist Party member. Yang Yaming, who had worked at the Institute since 1977, had previously held a senior administrative position but had been demoted in 1985, after she filed earlier complaints. A fourth employee who played an especially active role in the critics' campaign was Chen Dongxian, the orphanage driver. Other staff members sympathetic to the campaign included doctors, nurses and child-care workers.

Beginning in December 1989, the dissident staff members took their complaints beyond the orphanage itself to successively higher levels of the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, where they met indifference or outright opposition. Within the Institute itself, however, the initial staff response to the criticisms was

strongly favorable. Indeed, Zhang Shuyun was elected by a staff ballot in March 1990 to represent the orphanage in the People's Congress of Nanshi District, defeating Han Weicheng. In addition, Zhang Shuyun and Yang Yaming were selected in 1990 as the unit's "model workers."

However, this early sympathy was quickly dispelled. Senior staff, led by Han Weicheng, responded to the campaign with an escalating counterattack. More important, however, was the political support which Han Weicheng and his associates were able to obtain from higher authorities, particularly their immediate superiors in the Civil Affairs Bureau. By 1990, the critics had held two meetings with senior bureau officials, in December 1989 and February 1990, at which they gave detailed accounts of conditions at the orphanage.

Despite this, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau took no action against Han Weicheng. Indeed, the bureau reportedly provided Han with full details of the accusations made, in confidence, against him. On the basis of these reports, in March 1990 the orphanage management began to convene a series of large staff meetings to organize opposition to the critics. These meetings were coordinated with the actions of the Civil Affairs Bureau itself, which pressured the critics to abandon their campaign.

The orphanage management was also able to enlist Shanghai's official media in its defense. An article published in *Shanghai Masses Public Health News*, on March 29, 1990, praised the quality of management at the Institute and quoted Han Weicheng as saying that unnamed "comrades who have recently arrived at the Institute" were working to undermine the orphanage.

Then on June 25, 1990, Li Guilan was suspended from her duties as a speech therapist and was put to work cleaning windows and bathrooms; an untrained child-care worker was assigned to continue her work with deaf-mute children. On July 17, Zhang Shuyun was transferred to a minor post performing Chinese massage therapy, for which she has no professional qualifications, and her status was reduced from "specialized technical staff" to that of an ordinary worker, with correspondingly lower salary. She was denied all subsidies and bonuses and an effort was made to take away her private office.

On August 15, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau published a classified report which accused Zhang Shuyun, Li Guilan and Yang Yaming of conducting a smear campaign against the orphanage leadership. This document was circulated to Deputy Mayor Xie Lijuan and to other senior city officials.

APPEALS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY

By this time, the critics had already begun seeking assistance from other municipal agencies. After being told by Zhang Bangxiang, director of the city's Committee for the Protection of Young People and Children, that he could not help them, the critics contacted the Shanghai Municipal General Labor Union and began working closely with a staff attorney at the union, Shi Shengren.

The critics also wrote to the editors of several Shanghai newspapers. This approach was initially successful, leading to the appearance of two critical articles in *Labor News*, the organ of the Labor Union. The first of these articles, published in April 1990, dealt with the false accusation of theft made several weeks earlier against an orphan. A second article in May 1990 criticized the routine practice of tying orphans to their beds.

In September 1990, Zhang Shuyun, Li Guilan and Chen Dongxian contacted the Shanghai No.2 Law Firm for assistance in preparing a defamation lawsuit against Han Weicheng and *Shanghai Masses Public Health News* in response to the newspaper's article. The resulting judgment was only a partial

success, the Jing'an District People's Court held the newspaper liable for the false accusation, but accepted Han Weicheng's claim that he had been misquoted. Despite the partial defeat, two attorneys continued to cooperate with the critics, making clandestine visits to Shanghai No 2 Social Welfare Institute on Chongming Island in August and September 1991 and interviewing a number of former inmates of the orphanage there. During one of these visits orphan Chou Hui testified that she had been repeatedly raped and sexually abused by Han Weicheng.

Beginning in October 1991, the critics also began cooperating with several delegates to the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress (SMPC). Although sixteen delegates eventually joined the investigation into the orphanage, three who worked particularly closely with the dissident staff were Ma Mimi, the labor union chairwoman at the Shanghai Food Products Machinery Factory; Gao Junzhu, a retired teacher, and Xu Xinyuan, a labor union cadre at the Shanghai Photographic Apparatus Research Institute.

Shortly afterwards, on December 9, 1991, the Shanghai Labor Union released a brief but scathing memorandum written by Shi Shengren, which referred to the high rate of unnatural deaths at the institute and accused Han Weicheng of raping orphan girls. This was the first official acknowledgement of the severe problems at the Institute. This report was classified "intermediate-level secret" (*jimi*) and circulated only to a limited number of senior Shanghai officials, including Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, Xie Lijuan and members of the SMPC Standing Committee.

THE AUTHORITIES STRIKE BACK

The initial response to the Labor Union's report was swift. Within days, a work team from the city's Bureau of Supervision was dispatched to the Institute. The work team, which was to spend eight months conducting an inquiry on the orphanage grounds, immediately began collecting information from the dissident staff members.

Meanwhile, the SMPC took decisive action. Based on letters of complaint from the dissident staff, Lu Ming, a former senior procurator and a member of the SMPC's Legal Committee, convened a meeting on January 6, 1992, with a number of senior city law enforcement officials. At this meeting it was decided to send two officials from the Procuracy into the orphanage to investigate alleged criminal offenses committed by Han Weicheng. The Procuracy employees agreed to report back to a second meeting, scheduled for March 2.

In retrospect, it appears that the consensus reached on January 6 may have represented a tactical error on the part of the SMPC delegates. Efforts to investigate the extremely high ratio of deaths to admissions at the orphanage, although clearly the most serious element of the case, were temporarily set aside, as the delegates sought to build a criminal case against Han Weicheng. According to Zhang Shuyun, this partly reflected the delegates' belief that proof of orphans' unnatural deaths could expose Han to nothing more serious than administrative penalties for mismanagement. The general assumption was that the inquiry would make no substantial progress unless Han Weicheng were arrested, since this would eliminate the main obstacle to the investigation.

However, since institutionalized children throughout China are subject to essentially the same abuses that sparked the campaign in Shanghai—indeed, the 1989 death rate at the Institute was slightly lower than the national average—the eventual official response was that the city's highest leaders united in their determination to defend Han Weicheng.

In anticipation of what they believed might be Han's imminent arrest, those present at the January 6 meeting agreed that the SMPC's Legal Committee should formally prohibit him from leaving China. This turned out to be a prescient move, for the Civil Affairs Bureau twice submitted applications to the city's Foreign Affairs Office for permission for Han to travel abroad, which were turned down as a result of the Committee's action.

The March 11, 1992, meeting, at which the Bureau of Supervision submitted its first report to the SMPC delegates, suggests that the investigation was still relatively impartial. In its preliminary findings, the Supervision Bureau had concluded that there had been "violations of discipline" by the orphanage leadership and recommended that Han Weicheng be suspended from his duties on March 20. The bureau also called for the case to be "filed for investigation," a first step towards possible criminal charges. The response of senior officials responsible for overseeing the orphanage seemed cooperative. Sun Jinfu endorsed the Supervision Bureau's findings and even suggested that Han Weicheng be required to "confess" his wrongdoing.

Even at this early stage, however, danger signs had already begun to appear. One of the city's three major newspapers, *Liberation Daily*, had published an article on February 4 praising management of the Children's Welfare Institute, along with a photograph of Xie Lijuan standing beside Han Weicheng during a visit to the orphanage, indicating that Han had the deputy mayor's tacit support.

Other departments weighed in on Han's behalf as well. Despite his endorsement of the Supervision Bureau's recommendations, Sun Jinfu requested that Han's suspension as orphanage director be postponed, ostensibly to find a suitable replacement. Given the general indifference of China's civil affairs departments to the welfare of abandoned children, Sun's support for a beleaguered subordinate under these circumstances is hardly surprising. What was to prove far more devastating, however, was the increasingly ambivalent attitude of the SMPC leadership. The minutes of the delegates' March 11 meeting show that concerns about the political implications of the case were being voiced openly for the first time. Lu Ming, for example, stated that it would be crucial to establish that the Shanghai orphanage was better managed by the Communist authorities than by the Catholic Church operating under Nationalist rule.

At the same session, Ma Mimi described the case as the most difficult she had ever handled and suggested that the Civil Affairs Bureau could not be trusted to deal with it correctly. As she and other participants pointed out, forces were already gathering to divert the course of the investigation. Orphanage staff members who supported Han Weicheng had begun sending their own letters of complaint to higher authorities. More seriously, the orphanage had by this time begun an organized effort to suppress evidence on the unnatural deaths of hundreds of children. Ma Mimi noted that of 478 deaths recorded during the three-year period 1989-1991, the orphanage had so far handed over medical records for only 346, and these only after long delays during which many records were amended or falsified.

The second of the six main meetings held by SMPC delegates was convened on March 30, 1992. By this time, the attitude of the Supervision Bureau had changed substantially. The bureau's second report dealt with a number of individual allegations of misconduct by Han Weicheng and other staff members. It conceded that serious incidents had taken place, observing that in 49 out of the 346 deaths examined by the investigation team, no causes of death had been entered in the medical records and noting, without further comment, that "malnutrition" had been recorded as the cause of death in 99 cases. The question of unnatural deaths was evaded entirely.

The report also referred to highly unusual accounting practices at the Institute. These included the

unauthorized use for staff bonuses of funds donated to the orphanage by the abbot of the city's Jade Buddha Temple, as well as the existence of a personal account in Han Weicheng's name containing nearly US\$80,000 obtained from overseas donations and adoption fees. The director of the orphanage's Finance Department had told the work team, "The accounts are in my head." Apparently, the Supervision Bureau officials found this response acceptable, for they failed to pursue the matter.

On other crucial issues, notably the allegations of sexual assaults at the orphanage, the March 30 report was simply inaccurate or evasive. On the case of Chou Hui, who had allegedly been raped twice by Han Weicheng in late 1988, it sought to find inconsistencies in her testimony.

The March 30 report asserted that the Shanghai Municipal Communist Party Committee had "paid much attention to this matter," as had the Municipal Procuracy. Despite this high-level interest, however, the report failed to reach any coherent conclusion on the facts. Although the report conceded that the accusations made by the dissident staff members were "basically correct, and not a case of false accusation" it added, in an apparent effort at even-handedness, that the critics' actions had caused "chaos" and "serious antagonisms" within the orphanage.

The report ended by noting that after consultations with Sun Jinfu, the terms of Han's suspension had been altered from "relieved of duties for investigation" to "no longer in charge of orphanage work." This reclassification allowed Han to retain his salary and benefits while suspended. It seems clear, therefore, that the tide had turned decisively in Han Weicheng's favor during the second half of March 1992.

A further private session between SMPC delegates and the dissident staff, held on April 8 without representatives of the Supervision Bureau present, confirmed that a number of other city agencies had been informed of the investigation. But Han Weicheng's suspension had only been announced to six people, despite an earlier decision to publicize this widely among officials. Lu Ming stated: "In late March, I met with Sun Jinfu. [Sun said,] 'We must unify people's thinking on this matter. If the [news of] large-scale deaths got out, it would have an extremely bad influence and the consequences would be severe. This is a political issue, and we must deal with it as a political task.'" Lu himself noted, moreover: "This is precisely a question of human rights."

Still more ominously for the orphanage critics, Lu Ming confirmed at the April 8 meeting that their charges in fact represented the third round of criticism since 1986 by Institute employees. SMPC delegate Ma Renbing wondered aloud at this point: "Just how high up do these people's connections reach, that they're able to evade the law and go scot-free like this?"

THE INVESTIGATION COLLAPSES

On April 9, a bizarre incident took place at the Institute. A China Central Television camera crew, escorted by Civil Affairs Bureau officials, arrived to produce a report on the orphanage marking the first anniversary of the Protection Of the Disabled Law. Reporters on the crew ignored the dissident staff members and interviewed Han Weicheng. The crew told the critics that the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau and the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing had requested that the report be made.

On April 14, officers from the nearby Chengjiaqiao police station arrived at the orphanage with Civil Affairs Bureau staff and summoned Li Guilin, Yang Yaming and Chen Dongxian to the station for questioning, where they were accused of "persecuting" the TV crew. Zhang Shuyun was not questioned until the following day. All four staffers were released and told to go home to await further action.

The minutes of the April 17 fourth meeting of SMPC delegates show the investigation near collapse. Yu Ming, Deputy Director of the Supervision Bureau, opened the meeting by producing orphanage mortality statistics between 1989 and 1991 indicating much lower death rates than those calculated by the critics. He also suggested that only three of the hundreds of deaths could be considered unnatural. Officials of the Supervision Bureau also announced at this meeting that Chou Hui had retracted her accusations. However, when several of the SMPC delegates visited Chongming Island in mid-July Chou Hui repeated her charges during a tape-recorded interview.

During the April 17 meeting, Yu Ming also spoke of the overwhelming opposition of the orphanage staff to any punitive measures against Han Weicheng. On the morning of April 16, Yu and other Supervision Bureau officials had met with Han to discuss his suspension. By this time, some 42 orphanage employees, a sizeable proportion of the total, had signed petitions supporting Han. At a general meeting of the institute's "cadres of middle rank and above" later in the day to announce Han's suspension, these employees threatened to stop reporting to work if further measures were taken against him. Yu Ming described the meeting as "somewhat similar to the Cultural Revolution." The session was eventually suspended late in the afternoon and the Supervision Bureau then decided to "postpone" Han's suspension.

Following Yu Ming's description of these events, Gao Junzhu presented her own findings from a clandestine visit she and other delegates had made to the orphanage on October 20, 1991. She was "deeply shocked" by the visit, during which she saw the bodies of seven children who had been brought to the orphanage morgue within half a day.

More senior SMPC delegates continued to voice fears at the April 17 meeting about the political repercussions of the investigation. Ma Renbing expressed anger at the Supervision Bureau's findings, but added that it was necessary to "protect the image of socialism...of the Party, and of the orphanage." Lu Ming commented, "We must not let this news get out ... Imperialism wants to get its hands on this material of ours." At least one delegate, Ma Mimi, seemed to suspect that a decision to suppress the inquiry had already been made at a higher level.

The meeting ended with a discussion of whether the SMPC should conduct its own hearings. Although it had legal authority to do so, both Lu Ming and Standing Committee Chairman Wang Chongji rejected the idea. Lu Ming concluded: "The People's Congress will not question people [directly]... We must consider the political implications. I hope none of the delegates will leak the news." Wang Chongji concurred, adding that hearings "would increase the danger of news leaking out."

By this time, it was clear that this view was shared at the highest levels of the municipal government. During a face-to-face conversation in April 1992 which lasted some forty minutes, Wu Bangguo told one SMPC delegate that the issue was one of "human rights," and would therefore receive no publicity. A directive issued on Wu's personal instruction by the head of the municipal Propaganda Department, Jin Binhua, and circulated to all press and broadcasting outlets in Shanghai, made three stipulations on handling of the orphanage issue: no further critical reports were to be published on the Institute; all documentary materials on the orphanage were to be turned in to the municipal government; and special care was to be taken to ensure that foreigners did not get information about the case.

The dissident staff members and their allies had become increasingly despondent. At the suggestion of Ai Ming, who pointed out that hard evidence of atrocities might attract the attention of senior officials outside Shanghai, Zhang Shuyun provided Ai with a small camera which he and another child, Zhan Tong, used to take two rolls of film of conditions at the orphanage. Most of these pictures were of dead or dying children in the morgue and the "waiting-for-death room," while others showed children doing

laundry and other chores for child-care workers.

A third child later left the orphanage secretly and took the film to a photography shop. However, several staff had noticed Zhan Tong taking photographs outdoors, and Wang Yinian, then director of the Department of Social Welfare, ordered him detained overnight on April 19 for questioning in the department's offices on the orphanage grounds. Zhan Tong revealed the identity of the third child who was to return to the photography shop to claim the pictures. On April 20, Sun Jinfu arrived at the orphanage along with a number of PSB officers and the older children were all interrogated. Sun, Wang and several police officers then went to the photography shop and forced the owner to hand over the photographs and negatives.

Pressure on the dissident orphanage employees also continued to intensify after the April 16 staff meeting. The campaign of retaliation reached a peak on May 18, when Chen Dongxian was attacked and badly beaten by about 11 other employees. Two days later, Zhang Shuyun was visiting Chen Dongxian at his home when three officers from the Chengjiaqiao police station arrived and tried to take him into custody. When Zhang intervened, they threatened to beat her. She then telephoned Ma Mimi, who rushed to the headquarters of the PSB and received a promise that the harassment would stop. The police had by then called two additional officers to Chen's house, but they left after being paged by Chen Libin, the director of the Nanshi District PSB. But no criminal charges were ever brought against those who assaulted Chen Dongxian. Chen Libin later told the critics that he had received orders from his superiors at the municipal level not to assist them in pursuing the matter.

A fifth meeting between SMPC delegates and municipal officials was held on May 22, but Human Rights Watch/Asia has not obtained the minutes. On June 8, the sixth and last meeting was held. In attendance was Han Kunlin, director of the Shanghai Supervision Bureau and the most senior official to have attended thus far. Yu Ming, his deputy, opened the meeting by stating: "Our investigation work has now basically come to a close." Turning to the question of high death rates at the orphanage, he revealed that expert investigators from the Shanghai Municipal Procuracy and the city's Bureau of Public Health had examined the incomplete medical records of the 478 children who died there between 1989 and 1991, and that physicians from the latter bureau had focused on the question of whether the medical records had been tampered with. However, he failed to report the experts' findings on deaths from unnatural causes, merely stating: "The Supervision Bureau...is not a medical department, so we cannot reach any conclusions on this matter."

Yu then summarized the mortality statistics, as calculated according to three different methods: first, the annual deaths-to-admissions ratios during the period had been "50 percent, 60 percent and 70 percent respectively, averaging 64 percent"; second, the ratios of deaths only from among new admissions to the numbers of new admissions had been "between 40 and 50 percent, averaging 43 percent"; and third, the average ratio of deaths to total population had been "24 percent." Yu then asserted that the figure of 24 percent gave the most accurate picture of the mortality trend. Astoundingly, he then went on to state that a "top-level official" from the Ministry of Civil Affairs had recently come to Shanghai and informed him that, by comparison with orphanages elsewhere in China, "Shanghai's [death rates] cannot be considered to be very high."

Yu Ming then repeated, with some satisfaction, that since Chou Hui had now recanted her testimony, "The question of the rape does not exist." Another Supervision Bureau official added: "Judging by her appearance, she's not a child any more. She looks like someone who's already had children. You can even tell from her way of walking that she's had sex before."

On the allegations that Han had embezzled public funds, Yu stated that Han's having put the money in

his own bank account was of little importance, "since the sum was US \$79,000--not very much." He confirmed that orphans as young as 13 or 14 had been made to work in factories and workshops associated with the orphanage, and "this violated Shanghai's regulations on the protection of minors." But no disciplinary measures against those responsible were discussed.

At this point, Hong Dalin, an SMPC delegate and economist, could take no more. That morning, he revealed, he had met with Wu Bangguo and shown him the results of the delegates' various investigations. Wu had replied: "Just trust us. We will definitely inform the delegates of our decision on how to handle this case." Hong fired a series of questions at Yu Ming: Why had the investigation team, after examining hundreds of dead orphans' medical records, only come up with the same three cases of unnatural death first pointed out by the staff critics themselves? Was "congenital maldevelopment of brain" even a legitimate cause of death? How many medical records had the investigation team actually obtained? And why was Chou Hui, regardless of the truth or otherwise of her rape accusations, still being held against her will at the No.2 Social Welfare Institute? He then erupted with rage:

As regards what the senior official from the Ministry of Civil Affairs is supposed to have said... Are they trying to say that Shanghai's death rates still aren't high enough?... Tell me which ministry official said this. I want to express my views on the matter and take him to court. Surely our other cities and provinces don't also have people like Han!

The June 8 meeting marked the end of any hope for constructive action by Shanghai city authorities. It was clear to the dissident staff members that senior officials in Beijing would be equally unwilling to deal with the problem. Indeed, at least one of China's highest leaders, Chairman Mao Zedong's former secretary Hu Qiaomu, had personally interceded on Han Weicheng's behalf, apparently out of gratitude for the high quality of care his severely-retarded grandson, Hu Fangfang, was receiving at the Institute. For this reason, a second roll of film taken by Ai Ming in the summer of 1992, which also showed dead or dying children at the orphanage, was never submitted to higher authorities as originally planned, but was kept by Zhang Shuyun for nearly two years.

The final blow to the critics' hopes came in August 1992, when Chou Hui was removed from the No.2 Social Welfare Institute and detained for four months, without any apparent legal basis, at the Shanghai No.1 Jail. A letter sent from the jail to Zhang Shuyun suggested that Chou had been intimidated into retracting her allegations against Han Weicheng: the letter read, in part, "I know now that I was wrong! I listened to you once."

AFTERMATH

The pressure on dissident employees continued to intensify during late 1992 and 1993, until all of Han Weicheng's leading opponents had been transferred or driven out of the Institute. Zhang Shuyun was refused medical leave to treat heart palpitations and was asked to hand in the health card which entitled her to treatment at the Institute's expense. Beginning in March 1993, her base salary was suspended. One morning in May of the same year, she found her office door taped shut. This marked the beginning of her dismissal in stages. For the next several weeks, she continued to report to work but was denied meals, showers and other benefits, and was required to spend each day sitting in another office in the Rehabilitation Center. Zhang resigned in June 1993.

Other dissident staffers experienced similar treatment. Chen Dongxian was forced to resign in March 1993 and took up a job as a driver for a foreign joint venture. Yang Yaming resigned her position in 1994; she now works in the medical clinic of a sewing machine factory. Li Guilan was forced to take early retirement in late 1994. By this time, all other employees who had publicly supported the four

main critics had also been forced out, although a small number of staff members who had remained silent during the investigation of 1991-1992 retained their positions.

In October 1992, fourteen SMPC delegates signed a one-page letter to the SMPC Standing Committee, attacking Xie Lijuan and the SMPC leadership for their failure to halt the abuse of orphans and to protect the staff critics from retaliation. The delegates' willingness to sign this letter was largely an act of symbolic defiance, since by then the inquiry had been officially closed for several months.

In April 1993, new elections were held for delegates to the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress. In accordance with the Election Law, candidates for these seats are nominated by members of the public and then submit their names to the SMPC Standing Committee for screening. This screening process is normally predictable: elections are usually uncontested and turnover is very low. In the elections of spring 1993, however, none of the 14 SMPC delegates who had signed the October 1992 letter were re-selected by the Standing Committee. All were distinguished members of Shanghai's political elite with combined membership in the Chinese Communist Party of several hundred years. Given the prestige enjoyed by People's Congress delegates and the security of their seats under ordinary circumstances, the Shanghai delegates' failure to win re-selection was tantamount to outright dismissal.

Death by Default: A Policy of Fatal Neglect in China's State Orphanages was published by Human Rights Watch/Asia in January 1996. Copies can be ordered from: Human Rights Watch, 485 Fifth Avenue, 3rd fl., New York, NY 10017, Tel: (212) 972-8400.

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